Donoghue v Stevenson
Relevance
Also known as the snail-in-a-bottle case, the ratio of Donoghue v Stevenson established that the maker of a product is under a legal duty to the consumer to take reasonable care that the product is free from defect likely to cause injury to health.
More significantly, Lord Atkin in obiter laid down what would become known as the Neighbour Principle - a core concept in negligence that a duty of care is owed to persons closely and directly affected by an act, where it is reasonably foreseeable that act may cause those persons injury.
Facts
In circumstances that will probably haunt you next time you drink from an opaque bottle, Ms Donoghue’s friend brought her a ginger beer in an opaque bottle. When the SECOND glass was poured, a decomposed snail was added to the ginger beer and ice cream float. This allegedly caused Ms Donoghue ‘shock and severe gastro-enteritis’. Ms Donogue sought to sue the manufacturer but, having no contractual relationship, relied on an action in negligence.
Held
Lord Buckmaster
Lord Buckmaster thoroughly examined precedents and found no basis for overturning the established position at law that s duty of care only arose where a contractual relationship existed, except for where a product was dangerous in itself, or where a product is not dangerous in itself, but its maker knows it is dangerous due to some defect or other reason.
Lord Atkin
In the leading judgment, Lord Atkin reformulated Brett MR’s obiter in Heaven v Pender:
‘The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.’ (p 580)
The duty was said to arise when a person or property of another was in such proximity that, if due care were not taken, damage might be done to another. Proximity encompasses not just physical proximity but also extends to ‘close and direct relations’ (p. 581).
In the case of purchasers of products, Lord Atkin narrows this duty to be owed by manufacturers to purchasers who do not have the opportunity to inspect products before they are consumed (p. 582-583). Notably, Lord Atkins indicated that, even if he were not supported by authority, he would be inclined to take an activist approach:
‘I do not think so ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose that its principles are so remote from the ordinary needs of civilised society and the ordinary claims it makes upon its members as to deny a legal remedy where there is so obviously a social wrong.’ (p. 583)
Nonetheless, he examines the precedents in details and finds plentiful support for his decision, while distinguishing from cases that were founded on contract or fraud.
In relation to the manufacturer-consumer relationship in particular, Lord Atkin concludes by holding:
‘ ... a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.’ (p. 599)
Lord Tomlin
Lord Tomlin agreed with Lord Buckmaster, holding that if the pursuer (plaintiff) is to succeed, it can only be on the widest terms, that every manufacturer or repairer of goods owes a duty to every customer, which he considers ‘logically impossible’ (p. 599).
Lord Thankerton
Entirely agreed with Lord Atkin and allows the appeal.
Lord MacMillan
Lord MacMillan supported Lord Atkin in finding a duty of care on the circumstances, demonstrating a similarly activist approach:
‘The grounds of action may be as various and manifold as human errancy; and the conception of legal responsibility may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of judgement must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life. The categories of negligence are never closed.’ (p 619)
‘I do not think that any reasonable man or any twelve reasonable men would hesitate to hold that, if the appellant establishes her allegations, the respondent has exhibited carelessness in the conduct of his business.’ (p 619)
He states the manufacturers duty to consumers perhaps more succinctly than Lord Atkin:
‘I have no hesitation in affirming that a person who for gain engages in the business of manufacturing articles of food and drink intended for consumption by members of the public in the form in which he issues them is under a duty to take care in the manufacture of these articles.’ (p. 620)
This duty of care is limited it to acts of carelessness and not ‘pure accident’. Lord MacMillan also provides a summary of other principles of negligence:
‘It must always be a question of circumstances whether the carelessness amounts to negligence, and whether the injury is not too remote from carelessness.’
‘The burden of proof must always be upon the injured party to establish that the defect which caused the injury was present in the article when it left the hands of the party whom he sues, that the defect was occasioned by the carelessness of the party, and that the circumstances are such as to case upon the defender a duty to take care not to injure the pursuer.’ (622)
References
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100.
Joanna Kyriakakis et al, Contemporary Australia Tort Law (Cambridge University Press, 2020).